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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 90-1124
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KEITH JACOBSON, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the eighth circuit
[April 6, 1992]

  Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court.
  On September 24, 1987, petitioner Keith Jacobson was
indicted for violating a provision of the Child Protection Act
of 1984, Pub. L. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (Act), which
criminalizes the knowing receipt through the mails of a
``visual depiction [that] involves the use of a minor engag-
ing in sexually explicit conduct . . . .''  18 U. S. C.
2252(a)(2)(A).  Petitioner defended on the ground that the
Government entrapped him into committing the crime
through a series of communications from undercover agents
that spanned the 26 months preceding
his arrest.  Petitioner was found guilty after a jury trial.  The
Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, holding that the
Government had carried its burden of proving beyond
reasonable doubt that petitioner was predisposed to break
the law and hence was not entrapped.
Because the Government overstepped the line between
setting a trap for the -unwary innocent- and the -unwary
criminal,- Sherman v. United States, 356 U. S. 369, 372
(1958), and as a matter of law failed to establish that
petitioner was independently predisposed to commit the
crime for which he was arrested, we reverse the Court of
Appeals' judgment affirming his conviction.
                 I
In February 1984, petitioner, a 56-year-old veteran-
turned-farmer who supported his elderly father in Nebras-
ka, ordered two magazines and a brochure from a California
adult bookstore.  The magazines, entitled Bare Boys I and
Bare Boys II, contained photographs of nude preteen and
teenage boys.  The contents of the magazines startled
petitioner, who testified that he had expected to receive
photographs of ``young men 18 years or older.''  Tr. 425.  On
cross-examination, he explained his response to the maga-
zines:
-[PROSECUTOR]:  [Y]ou were shocked and surprised
that there were pictures of very young boys without
clothes on, is that correct?
-[JACOBSON]:  Yes, I was.
-[PROSECUTOR]:  Were you offended?
  .      .       .      .      .
-[JACOBSON]:  I was not offended because I thought
these were a nudist type publication.  Many of the
pictures were out in a rural or outdoor setting.  There
was-I didn't draw any sexual connotation or connec-
tion with that.-  Id., at 463.
The young men depicted in the magazines were not engaged
in sexual activity, and petitioner's receipt of the magazines
was legal under both federal and Nebraska law.  Within
three months, the law with respect to child pornography
changed; Congress passed the Act illegalizing the receipt
through the mails of sexually explicit depictions of children.
In the very month that the new provision became law,
postal inspectors found petitioner's name on the mailing list
of the California bookstore that had mailed him Bare Boys
I and II.  There followed over the next 2- years, repeated
efforts by two Government agencies, through five fictitious
organizations and a bogus pen pal, to explore petitioner's
willingness to break the new law by ordering sexually
explicit photographs of children through the mail.
The Government began its efforts in January 1985 when
a postal inspector sent petitioner a letter supposedly from
the American Hedonist Society, which in fact was a
fictitious organization.  The letter included a membership
application and stated the Society's doctrine:  that members
had the ``right to read what we desire, the right to discuss
similar interests with those who share our philosophy, and
finally that we have the right to seek pleasure without
restrictions being placed on us by outdated puritan morali-
ty.''  Record, Government Exhibit 7.  Petitioner enrolled in
the organization and returned a sexual attitude question-
naire that asked him to rank on a scale of one to four his
enjoyment of various sexual materials, with one being
``really enjoy,'' two being ``enjoy,'' three being ``somewhat
enjoy,'' and four being ``do not enjoy.''  Petitioner ranked the
entry ``[p]re-teen sex'' as a two, but indicated that he was
opposed to pedophilia.  Ibid.
For a time, the Government left petitioner alone.  But
then a new ``prohibited mail specialist'' in the Postal Service
found petitioner's name in a file, Tr. 328-331, and in May
1986, petitioner received a solicitation from a second
fictitious consumer research company, -Midlands Data Re-
search,- seeking a response from those who -believe in the
joys of sex and the complete awareness of those lusty and
youthful lads and lasses of the neophite [sic] age.-  Record,
Government Exhibit 8.  The letter never explained whether
``neophite'' referred to minors or young adults.  Petitioner
responded: ``Please feel free to send me more information,
I am interested in teenage sexuality.  Please keep my name
confidential.''  Ibid.
Petitioner then heard from yet another Government
creation, ``Heartland Institute for a New Tomorrow''
(HINT), which proclaimed that it was ``an organization
founded to protect and promote sexual freedom and freedom
of choice.  We believe that arbitrarily imposed legislative
sanctions restricting your sexual freedom should be rescind-
ed through the legislative process.''  Id., Defendant's Exhibit
102.  The letter also enclosed a second survey.  Petitioner
indicated that his interest in -[p]reteen sex-homosexual-
material was above average, but not high.  In response to
another question, petitioner wrote:  -Not only sexual
expression but freedom of the press is under attack.  We
must be ever vigilant to counter attack right wing funda-
mentalists who are determined to curtail our freedoms.-
Id., Government Exhibit 9.
-HINT- replied, portraying itself as a lobbying organiza-
tion seeking to repeal ``all statutes which regulate sexual
activities, except those laws which deal with violent
behavior, such as rape.  HINT is also lobbying to eliminate
any legal definition of `the age of consent'.''  Id., at
Defendant's Exhibit 113.  These lobbying efforts were to be
funded by sales from a catalog to be published in the future
``offering the sale of various items which we believe you will
find to be both interesting and stimulating.''  Ibid.  HINT
also provided computer matching of group members with
similar survey responses; and, although petitioner was
supplied with a list of potential -pen pals,- he did not
initiate any correspondence.
Nevertheless, the Government's ``prohibited mail special-
ist'' began writing to petitioner, using the pseudonym -Carl
Long.- The letters employed a tactic known as -mirroring,-
which the inspector described as -reflect[ing] whatever the
interests are of the person we are writing to.-  Tr. 342.
Petitioner responded at first, indicating that his interest
was primarily in -male-male items.-  Record, Government
Exhibit 9A.  Inspector -Long- wrote back:
-My interests too are primarily male-male items.  Are
you satisfied with the type of VCR tapes available?
Personally, I like the amateur stuff better if its [sic]
well produced as it can get more kinky and also seems
more real.  I think the actors enjoy it more.-  Id.,
Government Exhibit 13.
Petitioner responded:
-As far as my likes are concerned, I like good looking
young guys (in their late teens and early 20's) doing
their thing together.-  Id., Government Exhibit 14.
Petitioner's letters to -Long- made no reference to child
pornography.  After writing two letters, petitioner discontin-
ued the correspondence.
By March 1987, 34 months had passed since the Govern-
ment obtained petitioner's name from the mailing list of the
California bookstore, and 26 months had passed since the
Postal Service had commenced its mailings to petitioner.
Although petitioner had responded to surveys and letters,
the Government had no evidence that petitioner had ever
intentionally possessed or been exposed to child pornogra-
phy.  The Postal Service had not checked petitioner's mail
to determine whether he was receiving questionable
mailings from persons-other than the Government-in-
volved in the child pornography industry.  Tr. 348.
At this point, a second Government agency, the Customs
Service, included petitioner in its own child pornography
sting, ``Operation Borderline,'' after receiving his name on
lists submitted by the Postal Service.  Id., at 71-72.  Using
the name of a fictitious Canadian company called ``Produit
Outaouais,'' the Customs Service mailed petitioner a bro-
chure advertising photographs of young boys engaging in
sex.  Record, Government Exhibit 22.  Petitioner placed an
order that was never filled.  Id., Government Exhibit 24.
The Postal Service also continued its efforts in the
Jacobson case, writing to petitioner as the -Far Eastern
Trading Company Ltd.-  The letter began:
-As many of you know, much hysterical nonsense has
appeared in the American media concerning `por-
nography' and what must be done to stop it from
coming across your borders.  This brief letter does not
allow us to give much comments; however, why is your
government spending millions of dollars to exercise
international censorship while tons of drugs, which
makes yours the world's most crime ridden country are
passed through easily.-  Id., Government Exhibit 1.
The letter went on to say:
``[W]e have devised a method of getting these to you
without prying eyes of U.S. Customs seizing your
mail. . . .  After consultations with American solicitors,
we have been advised that once we have posted our
material through your system, it cannot be opened for
any inspection without authorization of a judge.''  Ibid.
The letter invited petitioner to send for more information.
It also asked petitioner to sign an affirmation that he was
``not a law enforcement officer or agent of the U.S. Govern-
ment acting in an undercover capacity for the purpose of
entrapping Far Eastern Trading Company, its agents or
customers.''  Petitioner responded.  Ibid.  A catalogue was
sent, id., Government Exhibit 2, and petitioner ordered
Boys Who Love Boys, id., Government Exhibit 3, a porno-
graphic magazine depicting young boys engaged in various
sexual activities.  Petitioner was arrested after a controlled
delivery of a photocopy of the magazine.
When petitioner was asked at trial why he placed such an
order, he explained that the Government had succeeded in
piquing his curiosity:
-Well, the statement was made of all the trouble and
the hysteria over pornography and I wanted to see
what the material was.  It didn't describe the-I didn't
know for sure what kind of sexual action they were
referring to in the Canadian letter. . . .-  Tr. 427-428.
In petitioner's home, the Government found the Bare
Boys magazines and materials that the Government had
sent to him in the course of its protracted investigation, but
no other materials that would indicate that petitioner
collected or was actively interested in child pornography.
Petitioner was indicted for violating 18 U. S. C.
2552(a)(2)(A).  The trial court instructed the jury on the
petitioner's entrapment defense, petitioner was convicted,
and a divided Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
sitting en banc, affirmed, concluding that -Jacobson was not
entrapped as a matter of law.-  916 F. 2d 467, 470 (1990).
We granted certiorari.  499 U. S. ____ (1991).

                II
There can be no dispute about the evils of child pornogra-
phy or the difficulties that laws and law enforcement have
encountered in eliminating it.  See generally Osborne v.
Ohio, 495 U. S. 103, 110 (1990); New York v. Ferber, 458
U. S. 747, 759-760 (1982).  Likewise, there can be no
dispute that the Government may use undercover agents to
enforce the law.  ``It is well settled that the fact that officers
or employees of the Government merely afford opportunities
or facilities for the commission of the offense does not
defeat the prosecution.  Artifice and stratagem may be em-
ployed to catch those engaged in criminal enterprises.''
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U. S. 435, 441 (1932);
Sherman v. United States, 356 U. S., at 372; United States
v. Russell, 411 U. S. 423, 435-436 (1973).
In their zeal to enforce the law, however, Government
agents may not originate a criminal design, implant in an
innocent person's mind the disposition to commit a criminal
act, and then induce commission of the crime so that the
Government may prosecute.  Sorrells, supra, at 442;
Sherman, supra, at 372.  Where the Government has
induced an individual to break the law and the defense of
entrapment is at issue, as it was in this case, the prosecu-
tion must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defen-
dant was disposed to commit the criminal act prior to first
being approached by Government agents.  United States v.
Whoie, 288 U. S. App. D. C. 261, 263-264, 925 F. 2d 1481,
1483-1484 (1991).
Thus, an agent deployed to stop the traffic in illegal drugs
may offer the opportunity to buy or sell drugs, and, if the
offer is accepted, make an arrest on the spot or later.  In
such a typical case, or in a more elaborate ``sting'' operation
involving government-sponsored fencing where the defen-
dant is simply provided with the opportunity to commit a
crime, the entrapment defense is of little use because the
ready commission of the criminal act amply demonstrates
the defendant's predisposition.  See United States v.
Sherman, 200 F. 2d 880, 882 (CA2 1952).  Had the agents
in this case simply offered petitioner the opportunity to
order child pornography through the mails, and petition-
er-who must be presumed to know the law- had promptly
availed himself of this criminal opportunity, it is unlikely
that his entrapment defense would have warranted a jury
instruction.  Mathews v. United States, 485 U. S. 58, 66
(1988).
But that is not what happened here.  By the time
petitioner finally placed his order, he had already been the
target of 26 months of repeated mailings and communica-
tions from Government agents and fictitious organizations.
Therefore, although he had become predisposed to break the
law by May 1987, it is our view that the Government did
not prove that this predisposition was independent and not
the product of the attention that the Government had
directed at petitioner since January 1985.  Sorrells, supra,
at 442; Sherman, 356 U. S., at 372.
The prosecution's evidence of predisposition falls into two
categories:  evidence developed prior to the Postal Service's
mail campaign, and that developed during the course of the
investigation.  The sole piece of preinvestigation evidence
is petitioner's 1984 order and receipt of the Bare Boys
magazines.  But this is scant if any proof of petitioner's
predisposition to commit an illegal act, the criminal
character of which a defendant is presumed to know.  It
may indicate a predisposition to view sexually-oriented
photographs that are responsive to his sexual tastes; but
evidence that merely indicates a generic inclination to act
within a broad range, not all of which is criminal, is of little
probative value in establishing predisposition.
Furthermore, petitioner was acting within the law at the
time he received these magazines.  Receipt through the
mails of sexually explicit depictions of children for noncom-
mercial use did not become illegal under federal law until
May 1984, and Nebraska had no law that forbade
petitioner's possession of such material until 1988.  Neb.
Rev. Stat. 28-813.01 (1989).  Evidence of predisposition to
do what once was lawful is not, by itself, sufficient to show
predisposition to do what is now illegal, for there is a
common understanding that most people obey the law even
when they disapprove of it.  This obedience may reflect a
generalized respect for legality or the fear of prosecution,
but for whatever reason, the law's prohibitions are matters
of consequence.  Hence, the fact that petitioner legally
ordered and received the Bare Boys magazines does little to
further the Government's burden of proving that petitioner
was predisposed to commit a criminal act.  This is particu-
larly true given petitioner's unchallenged testimony was
that he did not know until they arrived that the magazines
would depict minors.
The prosecution's evidence gathered during the investiga-
tion also fails to carry the Government's burden.  Petiti-
oner's responses to the many communications prior to the
ultimate criminal act were at most indicative of certain
personal inclinations, including a predisposition to view
photographs of preteen sex and a willingness to promote a
given agenda by supporting lobbying organizations.  Even
so, petitioner's responses hardly support an inference that
he would commit the crime of receiving child pornography
through the mails.  Furthermore, a person's inclinations
and ``fantasies . . . are his own and beyond the reach of
government . . . .  Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S.
49, 67 (1973); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 565-566
(1969).
On the other hand, the strong arguable inference is that,
by waving the banner of individual rights and disparaging
the legitimacy and constitutionality of efforts to restrict the
availability of sexually explicit materials, the Government
not only excited petitioner's interest in sexually explicit
materials banned by law but also exerted substantial
pressure on petitioner to obtain and read such material as
part of a fight against censorship and the infringement of
individual rights.  For instance, HINT described itself as
``an organization founded to protect and promote sexual
freedom and freedom of choice'' and stated that ``the most
appropriate means to accomplish [its] objectives is to
promote honest dialogue among concerned individuals and
to continue its lobbying efforts with State Legislators.''
Record, Defendant's Exhibit 113.  These lobbying efforts
were to be financed through catalogue sales.  Ibid.  Mail-
ings from the equally fictitious American Hedonist Society,
id., Government Exhibit 7, and the correspondence from the
non-existent Carl Long, id., Defendant's Exhibit 5, endorsed
these themes.
Similarly, the two solicitations in the spring of 1987
raised the spectre of censorship while suggesting that
petitioner ought to be allowed to do what he had been
solicited to do.  The mailing from the Customs Service
referred to ``the worldwide ban and intense enforcement on
this type of material,'' observed that ``what was legal and
commonplace is now an `underground' and secretive
service,'' and emphasized that ``[t]his environment forces us
to take extreme measures'' to insure delivery.  Id., Govern-
ment Exhibit 22.  The Postal Service solicitation described
the concern about child pornography as ``hysterical non-
sense,'' decried ``international censorship,'' and assured
petitioner, based on consultation with ``American solicitors''
that an order that had been posted could not be opened for
inspection without authorization of a judge.  Id., Govern-
ment Exhibit 1.  It further asked petitioner to affirm that
he was not a government agent attempting to entrap the
mail order company or its customers.  Ibid.  In these
particulars, both government solicitations suggested that
receiving this material was something that petitioner ought
to be allowed to do.
Petitioner's ready response to these solicitations cannot
be enough to establish beyond reasonable doubt that he was
predisposed, prior to the Government acts intended to
create predisposition, to commit the crime of receiving child
pornography through the mails.  See Sherman, 356 U. S.,
at 374.  The evidence that petitioner was ready and willing
to commit the offense came only after the Government had
devoted 2- years to convincing him that he had or should
have the right to engage in the very behavior proscribed by
law.  Rational jurors could not say beyond a reasonable
doubt that petitioner possessed the requisite predisposition
prior to the Government's investigation and that it existed
independent of the Government's many and varied ap-
proaches to petitioner.  As was explained in Sherman,
where entrapment was found as a matter of law, ``the
Government [may not] pla[y] on the weaknesses of an
innocent party and beguil[e] him into committing crimes
which he otherwise would not have attempted.''  Id., at 376.
Law enforcement officials go too far when they -implant
in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit
the alleged offense and induce its commission in order that
they may prosecute.-  Sorrels, 287 U. S., at 442 (emphasis
added).  Like the Sorrels court, we are -unable to conclude
that it was the intention of the Congress in enacting this
statute that its processes of detection and enforcement
should be abused by the instigation by government officials
of an act on the part of persons otherwise innocent in order
to lure them to its commission and to punish them.-  Id., at
448.  When the Government's quest for convictions leads to
the apprehension of an otherwise law-abiding citizen who,
if left to his own devices, likely would have never run afoul
of the law, the courts should intervene.
Because we conclude that this is such a case and that the
prosecution failed, as a matter of law, to adduce evidence to
support the jury verdict that petitioner was predisposed,
independent of the Government's acts and beyond a
reasonable doubt, to violate the law by receiving child
pornography through the mails, we reverse the Court of
Appeals' judgment affirming the conviction of Keith
Jacobson.
                       It is so ordered.